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ON CLASSISM AND DISSONANCE IN
THE CRIMINAL LAW: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR MEIR DAN-COHEN*
Richard Singer**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent article, Professor Meir Dan-Cohen proposed analyzing legal systems by determining the degree to which there is not
one set of rules aimed at all persons, but two sets-"rules of conduct," which purport to tell the general public what conduct is prohibited by the criminal law, and "rules of decision," which tell
judges and other decision makers what the true rules of the criminal
law are.' The distinction is based upon an observation, attributable
to Bentham, 2 that to speak of "the law" as a unity is misleading, for
there must be both rules which establish the norms of the law
("rules of conduct"), and rules which explain how those norms are
to be implemented and enforced ("rules of decision"). An obvious
illustratation is found in a rule-penalty context. A ("conduct") rule
that "Thou shalt not steal" gives no guidance as to what is to be
done with the thief; similarly, a ("decision") rule that "all thieves
should be executed" does not itself substantively define those to
whom the punishment direction applies. Of course, there may be
"mixed" rules, such as "All those who kill another person shall be
put to death," but even then the rule is divisible into segments directed toward different audiences and for different purposes.
The distinction between substantive rules of conduct and pro* This article was the subject of faculty seminars at Rutgers-Camden and at
Benjamin Cardozo Law School, and I thank all those colleagues who participated in
those sessions. Additional thanks are due to Joshua Dressler, who reviewed an early
draft of the paper.
** Professor and Dean, Rutgers-Camden Law School. J.S.D., Columbia University,
1977; LL.M., Columbia University, 1971; J.D., University of Chicago, 1966; A.B., Amherst College, 1963.
1 Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in CriminalLaw,
97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
2 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 626 (citingJ. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT
AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 (W. Harrison
ed. 1948)).
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cedural rules of penalty, however, is not the primary distinction
which Dan-Cohen has in mind. Indeed, there is a serious question
as to whether he considers sentencing or punishment law as a "rule
of decision" at all. 3 Instead, when Dan-Cohen uses the term "decision rule," it appears that he is concerned with substantive commands which entirely preclude punishment in a given situation.4
The paradigmatic case in his analysis would be a conduct rule declaring that all killings will be criminally punishable and a decision
rule exempting killers with red hair. In Anglo-American criminal
law, a decision rule establishing non-liability for a wrongful act is
termed an "excuse," such as duress, or reasonable mistake. The importance of Dan-Cohen's exclusive focus on the substantive criminal
law doctrines of mitigation or exoneration, 5 rather than on sentencing processes, will become apparent later in the discusssion.
Having established the "conduct-decision rule" dichotomy,
Professor Dan-Cohen suggests that much could be learned about
real legal systems if we posit an imaginary world in which no member of the general public would learn the true decision rules which
guide officials when conduct rules are broken and then compare that
world to ours. 6 He terms the general public's total lack of knowledge of decision rules "acoustical separation." 7 As the author
states:
Imagine a universe consisting of two groups of people-the general public and officials. The general public engages in various kinds
of conduct, while officials make decisions with respect to members of
the general public. Imagine further that each of the two groups occupies a different acoustically sealed chamber.... Now think of the law
as a set of normative messages directed to both groups. One set (conduct rules) is directed at the general public and provides guidelines for
conduct.... The other set (decision rules)8 is directed at the officials
and provides guidelines for their decisions.
3 See infra note 78 and accompanying text.

4 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 636-64.
5 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 636-64.
6 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 630.
7 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 630.
8 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 630. Professor Dan-Cohen's observation that Talmudic law recognized this distinction, Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at n. 1, is clearly correct
as far as it goes, but this is in part because "Jewish law is not confined within the boundaries of relations between man and man. [But includes] [m]atters concerning the relationship between man and God, which are actually matters between man and himself,
between him and his religious and moral feeling .. " Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish
Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 306, 311 (1961-62). Indeed, it was the aim of Jewish
society that every citizen become "learned" so as to understand not only the "law of
man" (conduct rules), but the laws of God (decision rules, including standards of morality); as Silberg puts it, the law "can have only one solid foundation: a common moral
concept shared by all of the nation's individuals." Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
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Dan-Cohen suggests some acoustic separation can be achieved
through what he calls "selective transmission." 9 Selective transmission occurs when the legislature (or the judiciary when it announces
a new rule of law) speaks either in very vague terms, or uses apparently coherent language which can later be interpreted by the courts
(or other decision makers) to achieve the true decision rule. In the
first case, in order to preclude persons from conduct X, the legislature may write a statute so vague that the public will understand the
statute as precluding conduct which is not X, but which is "nearly"
X. This vagueness encourages what Dan-Cohen calls "safe-siding" 10-avoidance of the possiblity that one's actions might be interpreted as falling within the statutory prohibition.
If, however, one is arrested for violating the vague statute by
performing non-X act Y, one will not be punished. Since the legislature has directed the decision rule to the courts, 1 they will interpret
the statute narrowly, to apply only to conduct X. The person who
has done Y, expecting to be punished because the vague statute appears to prohibit both X and Y, will find himself exonerated.
A second tactic suggested by selective transmission is the use of
ordinary words in statutes which the legislature actually intends to
be interpreted differently from ordinary usage.1 2 Additionally,
courts can still restrict the scope of a non-vague statute by imposing
a scienter or mens rea requirement into a statute which does not
appear on its face to require it.13 The purpose of this separation is
9 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 652-58.
10 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 650.

I1 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 670.
12 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 652-58.
13 The Model Penal Code has provided a rule of interpretation, which is also a rule of

substantive criminal law, with regard to this issue. Unless the legislature specifies a
mental state, the minimal mens rea required is recklessness. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(3) (1962). Of course, to the extent that the specific parts of the Code are
"known" by the offender, one might expect him to know the general part provisions as

well. Dan-Cohen's argument that judicial gloss is the remedy for the vagueness in decision rules, but that a requirement of scienter is the remedy for the vagueness in conduct

rules is difficult to follow, particularly in light of his principal example. Dan-Cohen,
supra note 1, at 658-64. His argument is that vagueness concerns about excessive
prosecutorial or police power can be dealt with by judicial gloss restricting the discretionary power of decision-makers (i.e., that when courts determine that X in a statute
means Y, any later court will be reversed beyond its discretionary bounds, if it seeks to
make X mean Y + Z). Similarly, where the concern is fair notice to the defendant of the
content of conduct rules (the only rules of which a defendant is by hypothesis aware) a
requirement of scienter as to all facts is sufficient, for it permits the defendant, who does
not know that his conduct is viewed as immoral (much less illegal), an excuse.

Thus far, the analysis is at least somewhat understandable. However, Dan-Cohen
then turns to a discussion of People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 361 (1964), in which the California Supreme Court held that a reasonable mistake
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clear-to deter illegal and even near-illegal conduct. As the author
puts it: "[T]he entire enterprise, central to the criminal law ... [is]
regulating conduct through deterrence... ";14 acoustic separation
clearly assists this goal. Assume that society has determined that
certain conduct, X, should be proscribed, but that if mitigating circumstance, Y, is present, the normal punishment should be abandoned (or halved, or whatever). Now, according to Dan-Cohen's
thesis, if the rule of conduct contains only the prescription against
doing X, without indicating that Y is a mitigating circumstance,
fewer people will be tempted to do X or even come close to doing
X, since there appears to be no way to avoid the full impact of the
criminal sanction. Thus, acoustic separation achieves maximum deterrence not only of actual criminal conduct, but also of dubious,
though legal, conduct. If, however, someone transgresses the conduct rule, the fact-finder may apply a "decision rule" which permits,
or even mandates, acquittal or alleviation of the penalty ostensibly
required by the conduct rule. Assuming some relationship between
the decision rule and fairness, a just outcome results.
In contrast, in a world without acoustic separation, the announced rule of conduct reveals the exemptive condition Y. Some
as to the victim's age would be a defense in a prosecution for statutory rape. Dan-Cohen, supra note I, at 656-58. This would appear to be a paradigm decisional rule undercutting the conduct rule. Yet Dan-Cohen refers to this opinion as making a "bold
statement about the link between criminal conduct rules and substantive morality." DanCohen, supra note 1,at 658 (emphasis added). This is confusing for two reasons. First,
the prior discussion would suggest that this opinion goes to a decisional rule, rather than
a conduct rule. Second, this distinction appears to be buttressed by the fact that, as DanCohen notes, the Hernandez opinion indicates that if the girl had not been seventeen, but
"younger," the defense of reasonable mistake of fact might not have been allowed. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d at 536, 393 P.2d at 677, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 365. If that is so, the ambiguity of the word "younger" as used by the court leaves open the possibility of a different
decisional rule without modifying the conduct rule. That is, it would seem that the conduct rule would continue to read "Anyone who has sex with a woman under eighteen is
guilty of statutory rape," but that the decisionalrule would read "Unless the girl is not too
young and the defendant made a reasonable mistake as to whether she was too young."
This, in turn, raises in a specific context the problem which, as I have tried to suggest, Dan-Cohen does not resolve. If we take him at his word that the Hernandez opinion
announced a new conduct rule, then this means that any judicial opinion which declares a
decision-rule exception to the statutory conduct rule itself becomes a conduct rule as
soon as it is made public. If so, the announcement of any decisional rule immediately
breaks the acoustic separation desired by Dan-Cohen and renders the distinction nugatory. On the other hand, he appears to argue that the arcane nature ofjudicial opinions
allows them to be considered as decisional rules, even after publication. Thus he says:
"[Diecision rules, directed as they are to a professional audience, are not less effective or
specific for being buried' in the volumes contained in law libraries." Dan-Cohen, supra
note 1, at 661. If this is accepted, his point about the relationship which Hernandez bears
to the changes in conduct rules is perplexing.
14 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 671-72.
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persons will then attempt to feign the condition Y, in order to perform the conduct and obtain the mitigated punishment. Moreover,
even where the defense is not feigned, there may be a greater temptation when condition Y exists to do X even for persons who would
otherwise refrain from doing X. Thus, in discussing duress, Professor Dan-Cohen asserts that "widespread knowledge of the availability of the defense ... might move people to succumb to threats
under circumstances in which such a decision, though personally rational, would be socially undesirable." 15 So long as society announces both the rule of conduct and the rule of decision-"do not
do X, unless Y"- people will either affirmatively seek to deceive the
law or will not affirmatively strive to avoid doing X when caught in a
situation in which Y is present.
The acoustic separation analysis appears to be a plausible description of a totalitarian regime. The Soviet Criminal Code, for example, prohibits "parasitism," or "antistate actions inflicting harm
on the national economy of the USSR." 1 6 The obvious vagueness of
this statute leads to an inference that it may be used for political
purposes, or more neutrally, to deter citizens from many acts which
may or may not fall within the intendment of the statute. Because
some decisions, even those of the highest courts, are not published,
the decision rules are retained as the province of a select few, literally as well as metaphorically.
Dan-Cohen's target, however, is not a totalitarian system, but
our own. The essence of his thesis is that these same techniques,
often for the same purpose, characterize Anglo-American substantive criminal law. Dan-Cohen protests throughout the piece that he
is not endorsing this system, but merely affording an understanding
of it. 1 7 In my own reading, however, he supports both selective
transmission and acoustic separation, primarily as a means to deter
persons from criminal and even near-criminal acts.
I disagree with both prongs of Dan-Cohen's paper. First, I do
not believe that the Anglo-American criminal law system now operates as Dan-Cohen suggests. Second, a system should not operate
that way, from either a utilitarian or a retributivist viewpoint be15 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1 at 670.
16 See Burford, Getting the Bugs Out of Socialist Legality: The Case ofJoseph Brodsky and a
Decadeof Soviet Anti-ParasiteLegislation, 2 AM.J. CoMP. L. 465 (1974); Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR (Aug. 7, 1975); Article, A Crackdown on Parasites
Begins, 35 CURRENT DIG. OF SOVIET PRESS 5 (1983); Article, Spelling out the Lau' Against
Vagrants, Beggars and Parasites, 37 CURRENT DIG. OF SOVIET PRESS 8, 22-23 (1985). See
generally, Pomorski, Crimes Against the CentralPlanner: Ochkovtiratel'stvo, in SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN, PART II 291 (1978).
17 See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 636-37, 677.
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cause, in the long run, a system with acoustic separation and selective transmission is both disutilitarian and unjust. I shall discuss
these criticisms in the order suggested.
II.

ACOUSTIC SEPARATION AS A DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

Professor Dan-Cohen states that his article merely attempts to
show how the present substantive criminal law operates, and to provide a model by which to analyze the current system. His description fails, however, because neither the case law nor the trend of the
law supports this assessment. Dan-Cohen purports to find support
for his claim that present substantive criminal law reflects acoustic
separation in three areas: (1) duress and necessity, (2) mistake of
law, and (3) vagueness.' 8 Neither the doctrines nor the materials
Dan-Cohen cites support his analysis. Ironically, he ignores areas of
the criminal justice system from which he may have found support
for his claims, particularly sentencing.
A.

DURESS AND NECESSITY

Dan-Cohen frequently alludes, in a rather obscure fashion, to
the doctrines of duress and necessity. In a section entitled "Application of the Model to the Criminal Law," 1 9 he seeks to substantiate
his claim that there is acoustic separation in the criminal law. However, Dan-Cohen's entire discussion of necessity and duress is
geared to an exception to the decision rule.2 0 I shall discuss that exception later; the point here is that, upon close reading, Dan-Cohen
does not in fact seek support for his primary thesis in duress and
18 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 658-67.
19 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 636-64
20 Dan-Cohen assumes that it is possible, or even right, to consider duress or necessity as a "defense" rather than as a negation of an element of the offense. See P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES, ch.2 (1983). Early common law writers such as
Blackstone, Coke, Hale and Hawkins, all saw these "situational excuses" as "negating"
free will, which in turn "negated" mens rea. Dan-Cohen's contention that the question
has been mooted "for centuries" is simply wrong, as is shown by the fact that he is
forced to retreat to James Fitzhughes Stephen, a famous judge and writer of the late
nineteenth century, to find support for the view that duress should not operate as a defense. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at n.16. The language of negating mens rea may be
fictitious, but the point is well-taken that persons acting under these circumstances are
not morally blameworthy and hence not deserving of punishment. If that view were
taken today, it would be unconstitutional to place the burden of proof relating to these
"defenses" upon the defendant. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Professor
Dan-Cohen's whole spectrum of defenses would rapidly be reduced to "gratuitous" defenses. It is important to note that Dan-Cohen assumes that these "defenses," including
some justifications, do not entail elements of the offense.
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necessity law, but rather, seeks indirect support by negative
inference.
Dan-Cohen's discussion of cases under the necessity and duress
rubrics form an underlying contention which is never fully explicated in his article. This contention can be reasonably articulated as
follows: (1) in a system of acoustic separation, decision rules are not
intended for the general public; (2) when a member of the general
public learns or can learn of the decision; rules, he should thereafter
be precluded from relying on the decision rule; (3) some cases in
the necessity-duress spectrum demonstrate the second part of this
argument; (4) consequently, the first part must also be present; (5)
therefore, American criminal law has acoustic separation. I wish
first to explore the empirical claim that necessity and duress "defenses" are made unavailable to persons who either know, or can
know, that the defenses (decision rules) exist. Here the author
points essentially to two groups of cases: prison escapes and the
duty to testify.
1.

Prison Escapes

Professor Dan-Cohen first points to the so-called "prison escape" cases, in which a prisoner who has been threatened with death
or rape can plead necessity in response to a charge of escape. 21 The
courts have on occasion surrounded the defense with rigid require23
ments. 2 2 In particular, Dan-Cohen points to People v. Lovercamp,
where the court established five "inflexible" criteria that must be
met before a jury will be allowed to consider the defense. Dan-CoDan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 641.
Cf State v. Horn, 58 Haw. 252, 566 P.2d 1378 (1977); People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d
333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977); State v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863 (Iowa 1978).
23 In People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974), the court
established five criteria which it required the defense to meet prior to even allowing the
case to go to thejury. One criteria is that the defendant surrendered himself to authorities immediately following the escape. Id. at 832, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115. Leaving aside
the obvious question of whether such a requirement makes the escape a futility, surely
the defendant is to be forgiven if he fears that (a) he will be returned to the same prison
from which he escaped and which, by another criterion of Lovercamp, was already unresponsive to his fears and complaints and (b) he may meet with even less receptivity after
his escape, at least prior to the trial for his escape. For these reasons, some courts after
Lovercamp, in opinions not cited by Professor Dan-Cohen, rejected the rigid "rules" of
Lovercamp even when they used these rules as "standards." E.g., State v. Baker, 598
S.W.2d 540 (Mo. App. 1980). The most impressive of these decisions was United States
v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 963 (1979), in which a
two-to-one majority held that the entire question of the defendant's volitional responsibility should be submitted to the jury without restriction. In reversing the decision, the
United States Supreme Court avoided this issue, by interpreting the statute in question
to make failure to turn oneself in a separatecrime or offense. United States v. Bailey, 444
U.S. 394 (1980).
21
22
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hen states that the court reached this holding because the prison
community, like the community of officials, "is highly attuned to
legal pronouncements affecting it,"24 and thus prisoners cannot be
allowed the defense under the same generous terms that others
have.
There are several specific problems here. First, the analysis ignores the fact that only fifteen years ago the courts simply disallowed the defense entirely, refusing even to consider the possibility
of a necessity-type defense, much less a "mens rea," "subjectiveresponsibility" approach. 25 In the last decade and a half, faced with
persuasive evidence both of the physical compulsions in prisons and
of the inability of prison officials to counter such threats, a number
of courts have allowed the defense. 2 6 Moreover: (1) the requirements essentially track the requirements of all necessity/duress defenses; 27 (2) some courts have already rejected the criteria as rigid,
and simply allow the case to go to the jury with the criteria as guidelines; 28 (3) the simple and important fact is that the courts have
publicly loosened, not rigidified, their position on this point in the
29
past decade.
Additionally, Professor Dan-Cohen misperceives the reason
why some courts have been reluctant to grant a potential defense to
prison escapees. His view is that this relucatance is due to a fear
that the prisoner has not resisted the prison threat sufficiently, and
has too readily relied on the defense. It seems much more plausible, and is much more consistent with the actual language of courts
adopting the Lovercamp rules, to argue that it is not excessive reliance upon the defense in situations which actually involve threats of
rape or worse, but fear that escapees will fabricate the threat itself
that has caused courts to hesitate before granting the defense. In
the closed prison society, threats are more difficult to prove (or disDan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 642.
State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972).
Helton v. State, 311 So. 2d 381 (Fla. App. 1977); State v. Horn, 58 How. 252,
566 P.2d 1378 (1977); People v. Harmon, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975). See
24

25 E.g.,
26 E.g.,

generally Comment, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1142 (1979). See also, Gardner, The Defense of
Necessity and the Right to Escapefrom Prison-A Step Towards Incarceration Free From Sexual
Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 110 (1975).
27 The general requirements for a duress or necessity plan are that there be an immediate threat of serious bodily harm or death, and that there be no viable alternatives
available to the defendant other than the criminal act. Viability may be tested in various
ways; in the prison context, it would seem to suggest, for example, that the prisoner
have complained to the proper officials without success and without protection. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. Sco'rr, CRIMINAL LAw 374-88 (1972).
28 See Comment, supra note 26; Note, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 413 (1979).
29 See supra note 26.
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prove) than in society at large. Courts are not concerned that prisoners will be forced to escape once threats are made, but rather that
they will simply lie about the presence of threats. Dan-Cohen's contention that these cases support his view that the law denies a decisional rule to those who are aware of it is thus largely refuted, rather
than supported, by this line of cases. If the courts were supporters
of acoustic separation, they would either continue to deny any defense, or certainly embrace it more slowly than has been the case.
2.

The Duty to Testify, and to Testify Truthfully

Dan-Cohen's second example of the denial of a necessity or duress defense to those who could know the decision rule is a single
case in the area of the duty to testify. In People v. Carradine,3 0 the
defendant was threatened with death if she testified in court. When
indicted for failing to testify, she claimed duress, but the court denied the claim.3 1 Dan-Cohen's premise is that since the defendant
could have obtained legal protection (and thereby understood the
law) the law properly denied her claim of duress. 3 2 There is a difficulty here, however, which is only obliquely acknowledged. Two
leading cases-dealing not with refusal to testify but with actual perjury-have each allowed a defense of duress. 33 Yet, one would expect that if a poor, frightened person who has never been near a
court of law is not afforded a defense of duress because she could
have obtained legal advice, then those who actually lie in court
would certainly be denied such a defense. Dan-Cohen relegates
these cases, which are much more important, and more widely dis34
cussed, to a footnote.
I do not suggest these two perjury cases epitomize the law of
duress; but I do suggest that reference to one case is simply insufficient support for Dan-Cohen's assertion. At the very most, the cases
split over whether persons who are, or could become, familiar with
the law are denied a duress defense; at the least, it is Carradinethat is
aberrant.
B.

MISTAKE OF LAW

The first area from which Professor Dan-Cohen can fairly begin
claim
support is the mistake of law. There is, as he says, an alto
30 52 Ill. 2d 231, 287 N.E.2d 670 (1972).
31 Id. at 234, 287 N.E.2d at 672.
32 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 642-43.

33 Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392 (1939); R. v. Hudson [1972] 2 All E.R. 244
(C.A.)
34 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 643 n.44.
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most universal sense that if laymen know anything about the criminal law, it is that "ignorance of the law does not excuse."' 3 5 Yet the
author suggests that this Draconian conduct rule is weakened in
practice by a number of rules or exceptions.
He lists several exceptions: (1) the offense is malum prohibitum; (2) the charge is based on a regulation; (3) the subject matter
is not likely to be legally regulated; (4) the statute in question does
not serve an important interest; (5) mens rea is negated by the ignorance of law; (6) the offense charged is a specific intent crime; (7)
the ignorance pertains to a non-criminal law; (8) the defendant relied on an authoritative source of law; and (9) the charge is based on
36
an omission.
If these exceptions were as well established as Dan-Cohen suggests, or if they were established at all, they would provide strong
ammunition for his claim that the conduct rule is disturbingly misleading. Alas, it is not so. Many of the cases cited as supporting the
alleged exceptions to the doctrine either do so in dicta, 3 7 or worse,
in negative implications from the direct holding that a mistake of
law is no defense. Moreover, the author is guilty of double or tripledipping. Cases cited for the propostion that mens rea can be negated by a mistake of law (exception five) 38 are also cited for the
propositon that a specific intent can be negated by a mistake of law
(exception six). 3 9 Indeed, the cases are ones in which the court
found that a specific intent was the mens rea required. Moreover,
most of the cases which would support this position, only some of
which are cited in the author's exception, 40 are mistaken "claim of
right" cases 4 1 in which the mistake is regarding a non-criminal law;
Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 645-46.
Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 646.
37 E.g., St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955).
38 To support this "exception," the author cites three cases. Two of these, Long v.
State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949), and State v. Collins, 15 Del. 536, 41 A. 144
(1894), are from the same jurisdiction and do not appear to have been followed in any
other state. The third, State v. Sawyer, 95 Conn. 34, 110 A. 461 (1920), is a typical
"claim of right" case where a landlady seized chattels belonging to a former tenant because she believed that the tenant had damaged the apartment and was obligated to pay
for the damage.
39 See cases cited, supra note 38. Only Hargrove v. United States, 67 F.2d 850 (5th
Cir. 1933), is added to the cases cited.
40 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 641.
41 These cases invoke mistaken claims of rights where the defendant believes that as
a result of property law or contract damage law he may take or retain control over property which "legally" belongs to the victim. Claims of lien, or of inheritance, are among
these cases. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 28 Ark. 126 (1873); State v. Newkirk, 49 Mo. 84
(1871); Goforth v. State, 827 Tenn.(8 Hum.) 37 (1847). These cases are indeed anomalous, but they hardly constitute a mpvement away from the doctrine.
35
36
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yet ignorance of a non-criminal law is yet another of the author's
exceptions (exception seven).42 There is surely nothing wrong with
having cases do double duty if the propositions for which they are
used are different; when the cases are merely restatements of the
first proposition, however, it is unproductive.
Moreover, the listing of "different" rules suggest many exceptions; in fact, to the extent that there are cases which support these
analyses at all, they are scant indeed, as even his footnotes show.
Moreover, at least some of the cases cited by the author are
directly opposed to one or more of his exceptions. Two cases heav44
ily relied on are Lambert v. California43 and Reyes v. United States.
Indeed, these two cases together are either the sole or primary citations for three of the nine alleged exceptions to the rule; no other
cases are cited. Scrutiny of the decisions, however, shows them to
be far less supportive than alleged. Lambert involved an ex-felon
who, having moved to Los Angeles after release from prison, was
charged with violating a city ordinance which required all ex-felons
staying in the city for more than five days to register with the police.4 5 Lambert's conviction was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court on the grounds that she should have been permitted
46
to introduce evidence that she was unaware of the duty to register.
Lambert does in fact suggest an amelioration of the mistake of law
doctrine.
The Reyes case, however, far from supporting the notion that
the courts have recently ameliorated the rigid dogma of mistake of
law, reinforces that doctrine, even though the facts of the case are
even more appealing than Lambert. The defendant in Reyes was con47
victed in 1943 of possession of a small amount of marijuana.
48
Fourteen years later he took a short trip to Mexico.
He failed to
register with border police, and in so doing violated a statute requiring such registration by persons convicted of drug related crimes. 4 9
Rejecting all argument that Lambert applied, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction. 50 Reyes is an even more sympathetic defendant than Lambert who, after all, was convicted of a
felony. Moreover, Lambert had lived in Los Angeles when con42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 646.
355 U.S. 225 (1955).
258 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1958).
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 226.
Id. at 229.
Reyes. 258 F.2d at 776.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 783-85.
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victed of the felony;5 ' fourteen years intervened between Reyes' minor conviction and his trip to Mexico. Lambert had been convicted
of a state crime, and failed to obey a registration ordinance of the
city of Los Angeles in that same state; 52 Reyes's marijuana conviction was in California, but his failure to register was condemned by
federal law. 53 Finally, at the time that Reyes was convicted in 1943,
there was no federal registration requirement-the statute was
passed subsequent to his conviction. 5 4 Yet, despite these possible
"exceptions" to the mistake of law doctrine, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Reyes' conviction for failing to register. 5 5 It is difficult to see
how this case, either in its holding or reasoning, can support any
exceptions to the "no mistake" dogma. Yet Dan-Cohen relies heavily on it in arguing that there are such exceptions, and that they
56
support the "acoustic separation" analysis.
A similarly disturbing pattern is found in other cases cited. One
of the exceptions suggested by Dan-Cohen is that mistake of law
may be a defense if the offense is malum prohibitum. 5 7 Yet, as the
author himself notes, 58 the courts in many cases, including some
cited by him in support of other exceptions, 5 9 have found mistake of
law to be a defense by construing a statute to remove the offense from
the malum prohibitum group and into the malum in se group. The
courts then hold that the offense requires a specific intent. This specific intent (exception six) can be defeated by a mistake of law. For
example, in United States v. Chicago Express,60 the court expressly concluded, in requiring mens rea, and hence allowing a mistake or ignorance of the law defense, that "Congress ...removed violations of
the relevant regulations from the classification familiarly known as
offenses malum prohibitum ...."61 In short, the court was acknowledging that where the violation is regulatory, the defendant will
(contrary to another alleged exception) 6 2 normally be liable, but
51 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 226.
52 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 226.
53 258 F.2d at 776.
54 Id.

55
56
57
58
59
note
60

61
62
note,
cases

Id. at 785.
See Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 645-48.
Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 647 n.54.
Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 647.
For example, the "charge based on a reputation exception." Dan-Cohen, supra
1, at 647 n.55.
235 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1956).
Id. at 786.
Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 647 n.55. Chicago Express, although cited in this footis not directly cited as the "exception"; the author merely lists it among "other
on the subject."
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that where Congress has explicitly removed the instant situation
from a mere regulatory infraction, ignorance of the law may be a
defense. Thus, the case, far from supporting the exception which
Dan-Cohen asserts, seems to undercut it totally.
Another of the cases cited, again for two propositions, is State v.
Collins. 63 This is a report of the proceedings in the trial court. The
instructions to the jury are reported; 6 4 the jury acquitted the defendant on a charge of embezzlement. 6 5 While I would not suggest
that a trial court's opinion, or even instructions, cannot be useful, it
seems to stretch the argument to the breaking point to cite this case
as a foundation for the "exceptions" to a dogma which has been
generally accepted for at least two hundred years.
In short, there is actually very little precedent, and certainly
very little cited by Dan-Cohen, which supports the exceptions which
he so bravely enlists in support of his notion that there are "hidden"
decisional rules which undermine the unthinking application of the
mistake of law doctrine. Meanwhile, the doctrine itself continues its
66
unhappy vitality.
63 15 Del. 536, 41 A. 144 (1894).

64 Id. at 539-42, 41 A. at 145-46.
65 Id. at 542, 41 A. at 146.
66 One of the more ludicrous recent cases is United States v. Freeman, 535 F.2d 1251

(4th Cir. 1976) in which the court declared that an ordinary person is charged not
merely with knowledge of state statutes (civil and criminal) but with every regulation
found in the Code of Federal Regulations as well.
Some of the cases on "mistake of law" regarding regulations can be explained on
the basis that the defendants engaged in activity which they know, or should have
known, can be regulated. This puts criminal liability on a negligence basis. See, e.g.,
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); United
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1970).
However distasteful criminal negligence may be as a basis of liability, it is understandable. Unfortunately, as Justice Stewart noted in InternationalMinerals, the ratonale
extends even to non-corporate entities ("Mom and Pop") who inadvertently get caught
in the regulatory net. InternationalMinerals, 402 U.S. at 569 (Stewart,J., dissenting). It is
these actors, who are not even negligent, who are impaled on the doctrine as it now
stands.
The "regulation" cases are best understood not as mistake of law cases, but as real
ignornce of the law cases. Ignorance of the law is precisely that-a total unawareness that
the act which one intends to perform is, or might be, covered by law, common or codified. The doctrine that ignorance of law was no defense (taken, erroneously, by Coke
and then Blackstone from the argument of a lawyer in a reported civil case, Plowden
343), might have made some sense when the criminal law accurately reflected moral
notions. A claim that one did not know that murder, or theft, or rape, was against the
law was so patently unreasonable that it could be summarily dismissed. For true ignorance of law cases see, In re Etienne Barronet, 118 Eng. Rep. 337 (1852); R. v. Esop, 173
E.R. 203 (1836); R. v. Bailey, 168 Eng. Rep. 651 (1800); Ham qui tam v. McClaws, I
Bay's (SC.) 93 (1789), R. v. Ross [1945] 3 D.L.R. 574 (B.C. Co. Ct.). To cover such
cases, the Model Penal Code provides a defense if the rule or statute in question has not
been published, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.042(3)(a) (1962). Mistake of law cases, how-
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THE ROLE OF THE VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

More persuasive is Dan-Cohen's position on the role of the
vagueness doctrine. The real impact of the void-for-vagueness rule,
he suggests, is that it allows the legislature to speak in very sweeping
language, thus deterring borderline conduct, but empowers the
courts to strike down or narrow the language, as applied in situa67
tions where the conduct is either de minimis or innocuous in fact.
While this interpretation is attractive, it fails, however, to note that
many vagueness cases invalidate the statute (the overly broad
threat) rather than the application itself.68 Indeed, while I have not
done a quantitative study, my sense is that more vagueness decisions invalidate statutes on their face than as applied. Surely if the
common law constitutional courts were interested in retaining
acoustical separation as Dan-Cohen believes, they would invalidate
the application of the statute, leaving its overly broad threat on the
books to intimidate others. Nevertheless, there is some legitimacy
to Dan-Cohen's reading of this area of the law and it is the strongest
argument Dan-Cohen develops to support his general thesis that
present substantive criminal law illustrates a system in which there is
acoustic separation and selective transmission. Still, on the whole, I
find this section of his argument unconvincing.
Moreover, in two of the main areas discussed, duress and necessity, and mistake of law, the newly reinvigorated "subjectivist bug"
has been active. 6 9 In recent years: (1) duress has, for the first time,
been allowed as a defense to a charge of murder; 70 (2) reasonable
ever, generally involve reliance upon someone else's interpretation of a rule which the
actor knows arguably applies to his proposed conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.041(3)(b). See also Creme, The Ironiesof Law Reform: A History of Reliance on Officials as
a Defense in American CriminalLaw, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 48 (1978). In the recent regulation
cases, the claim is phrased under "mistake," but the underlying essence is ignorancethat it is simply impossible for any person to be familiar with the tomes of federal and
state regulations. To this, the Court in InternationalMinerals, 402 U.S. 558, responded
that corporations engaged in the business of interstate shipping of materials know that
the Interstate Commerce Commission regulations pervade the activity and therefore,
are put on actual, as well as constructive, notice that they might be subject to regulation
for any specific shipment.
67 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 658-65.
68 See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
69 Wells, Swatting the Subjectivist Bug, CRIM. L. REV. 209 (1982).
70 In Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653,
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords held for the first time, by a three-to-two
majority, that an acccomplice to murder could raise duress as a defense. In Abbott v.
The Queen, [1976] 3 All E.R. 140, however, the Judicial Council of the Privy Council,
sitting on appeal from Trinidad, distinguished Lynch, and held that the defense of duress
was not available if the defendant personally killed the victim. The facts of the case are

detailed in V.

NAIPAUL, THE RETURN OF EVA PERON AND THE KILLINGS IN TRINIDAD

(1980). The point here, however, is that English jurisprudence has "softened" in the
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reliance upon authority has been explicitly established as a potential
defense in mistake of law cases; 71 (3) honest, yet unreasonable mistake of fact as to age, or consent, has been allowed as a defense to
sexual offenses; 72 and (4) the rigid boxes of the common law, as to
provocation and mitigation defenses to manslaughter have been
shattered. 73 Dan-Cohen acknowledges none of these developments.
D.

ACOUSTIC SEPARATION IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM-UNCITED
SUPPORT FOR THE THESIS

Intriguingly, Dan-Cohen fails to treat in any significant way the
areas of present criminal procedure which might in fact reflect the
"bark-bite" philosophy of acoustic separation. Surely plea bargainpast decade. Further, the Model Penal Code would allow duress as a defense to all
crimes. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09.
71 See United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013
(1975). Accord MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b).
72 Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 196 Cal. Rptr. 361. Cf. People v. Olsen,
149 Cal. App. 3d 125, 196 Cal. Rptr 491 (1983), rev'd, 36 Cal. 3d 638, 205 Cal. Rptr.
492, 685 P.2d 52 (1984).
Dan-Cohen discusses the "age mistake" cases at length, arguing that they are not in
fact symptomatic of a new emphasis on mens rea, but merely of a change in social mores
as to sexual liaisons. Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 656-58. He argues that even in those
cases allowing a reasonable mistake defense (e.g., Hernandez), the clear implication of the
opinion is that if the age were substantially lower (e.g., ten), mistake would not be a
defense. Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 658. This, he argues, suggests that the more recent cases reflect a change in morality that intercourse with "young women" may be
acceptable. Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 657. Thus, the "mens rea" of which Bramwell
spoke in Regina v. Prince is "general knowledge of immorality, if not illegality;" since the
line of "immoral" conduct has changed, Dan-Cohen sees Hernandez as "comport[ing]
rather than conflict[ing] with Bramwell's reasoning in Prince." Dan-Cohen, supra note 1,
at 656. He does not, however, consider the application of this theory to the decision in
Morgan that any honest mistake as to consent no matter how unreasonable, is a full defense to rape. D.P.P. v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347. See Singer, The Resurgence of Mens
Rea: II-Honest But UnreasonableMistake of Fact, 27 B.C.L REV. - (1987) (forthcoming).
73 In the last quarter century, nearly all of the inflexible doctrinal "boxes" of provocation-manslaughter have fallen. In 1957, England legislatively abolished the need for
legally "adequate" provocation, see 1957 Homicide Act, sec. 3, and in 1978, the House
of Lords effectively finished the job in D.P.P. v. Camplin, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 679. In
America, the Model Penal Code achieved a similar result, although its position has not
been universally adopted. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b). The general problems
of manslaughter, as well as the recent movement toward virtually total subjectivity, are
covered in Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I-Provocation,Emotional Disturbance,and the
Model Penal Code, 27 B.C.L. REV. 243 (1986). The revival of subjectivism as the major
focus of the criminal law is far too complex a topic to discuss here. In the above cited
article I have attempted to trace the history of provocation, and the recent changes
which have occurred therewith. I hope to pursue some of the other recent changes in
future articles. My point here is simply that even as a description of what courts do
today, Professor Dan-Cohen's article is misleading, both because it does not adequately
discuss the cases which take a different view, and because it fails seriously to recognize
these cases as the symptoms of a more important change occurring in the criminal law.
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ing and sentencing are two areas where the law in its majesty threatens substantial penalties, but allows and even encourages far lighter
sanctions. Indeed, Dan-Cohen's point might be well taken if it related more to sentencing and did not purport to explain substantive
crminal law doctrines. Thus, for example, in Regina v. Dudley and
Stephens, 74 the two defendants, found guilty of capital murder, were
essentially pardoned as everyone knew they would be. 7 5 In several
cases where defendants have killed "thin skulled victims," the courts
have affirmed the harsh doctrine that lack of knowledge of this condition is irrelevant to liablity, but have surreptitiously imposed
sentences closer to assault than to homicide. 7 6
Although Dan-Cohen occasionally mentions sentencing, 77 he
generally shies away from an extended discussion. Perhaps he
avoids sentencing issues because these areas of attempted acoustic
separation demonstrate the insidiousness of the very system he supports; a system in which persons familiar with the decision rules are
able to manipulate the process to obtain unfair advantage. I do not
wish to discuss here whether recent sentencing "reforms" have altered this bark-bite system; 78 I simply suggest that it is here, and not
in the substantive criminal law, that Dan-Cohen might have found
more fertile ground to sustain his thesis.
III.

ACOUSTIC SEPARATION AS A MODEL OF A DESIRABLE
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

A.

TOWARD A CLASSIST SOCIETY

1.

Of Leakage in a World of Acoustic Separation

Although Dan-Cohen posits a world of "perfect acoustical separation," such a world is impossible both in fact and in theory. Even
if it were possible to speak of the "general public" and "officials" as
74 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
75 See infra text accompanying notes 96-101.
76 For example, in State v. Frazier, 339 Mo. 966, 98 S.W.2d 707 (1936), the defendant struck the victim once in the jaw with his fist. Because the victim was a hemophiliac,
a fact unknown to defendant, the victim died. Id. at 972, 98 S.W.2d at 710. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter, but the actual penalty imposed was a fine of $400
and six months in jail. Id. at 969, 98 S.W.2d at 709. Six months, surely not by coincidence, was the usual penalty for mere assault. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 565.070, 585.011
(1936).
77 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, passim.
78 In the past ten years, as a result of a number of pressures, some from retributivists,
see R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS (1979); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976), legislatures
and others have been ostensibly regularizing their sentences to reflect a concern with
the crime and less concern with individualized factors relevant to the offender. It is at
least arguable, however, that the disparity which generated much of this movement has
simply been repackaged in a more modern and impartial-appearing garb.
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two separate classes for some kinds of conduct, the fact is that some
leakage of the decision rules to members of the general public is
inevitable. First and most obvious, is the fact that in the United
States at least, publication of opinions, both by professionals and
the press, is widespread. Even if these materials are usually only
read by lawyers (laymen evidencing better sense), the decision rules
are available to any member of the general public who wants to read
them. Second, and perhaps more important operationally, some decision makers, such as jurors, are members of the general public, at
least in the current Anglo-American system of criminal justice. If
decision rules are to be applied before conviction, 79 the jurors must
be told of the decision rules as well as of the conduct rules. When
most members of the community have the opportunity to sit on juries, there is substantial leakage.8 0 This means, as a matter of definition, that while some actors will be aware of the decision rules, which
allow leniency to offenders, other actors will not be so aware.
More perfidiously, some members of the groups to whom the
decision rules are addressed are likely to be able to take unfair advantage of this knowledge. Officials, after all, will also be part of the
audience for whom the rules of conduct are promulgated. The interdictions against stealing, killing and tax fraud will surely be aimed
at them as much as against the members of the "general public."
Even leaving aside the effect of comradery among officials, which
would be likely to lessen the punishment when one of their own
kind is accused and convicted, the ability of officials to avoid either
accusation or conviction, not because of corruption, but because of
their superior knowledge of the law, will result in an unequal and
unfair application of both the excusing condition and the law itself.
Indeed, to the extent that Professor Dan-Cohen is correct, and
members of the general public will be deterred from violating the
conduct rule because there appears to be no recognition of mitigating or excusing conditions, these conditions will be applied only to
the knowledgeable.
Nor are officials the only parties who will be favored by knowledge of the rules of decision. All those who by their participation in
79

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

80 A cynic might argue that, at least until very recently,juries were composed primar-

ily of white, male, middle class (or higher) citizens who closely parallel those who would
be privy to the decision rules anyway. However, two decades ofjury reform, both judicial and legislative, have resulted in more diverse juries. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky,
106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968); People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782,
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 365 (1984); Jury Selection and Service Act of 1983, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1861-69 (1982).
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the decision-making process are made aware of the substance of the
decision-making rules, will eo ipso be made part of the favored class.
Thus, judges, legislators, lawyers, their secretaries and assistants,
and all others who participate in this process will be aware of the
dissonance between the law on the books and the law in action.
This establishment of a two-class society of actors is scarcely conso8
nant with a democratic theory of government.
The difficulty runs even deeper, however, particularly if the theory of acoustic separation is to be defended, as Professor Dan-Cohen defends it, on utilitarian grounds. 82 In addition to the class of
officials, the very "class" that Professor Dan-Cohen would probably
be most anxious to deter-the "habitual" or "professional" criminal-will, as a matter of course, soon discover the discrepancies as
well. Such an offender will learn that there is a conflict between the
conduct rules and decision rules each time he is prosecuted, becoming privy to the legal dissonance as are the officials themselves. This
knowledge will, of course, spread rapidly through the prison system,
and hence become familiar lore to every member of the very class
targeted for specific deterrence. Officials, or others of the "knowledgeable class," may be unwilling to act upon their recognition of
the differences between decision and conduct rules, but it surely is
unlikely that habitual and professional criminal will be so selfcensoring.
Intriguingly then, it would appear that the acoustical separation
supported by Professor Dan-Cohen would thus result in a threetiered society: (1) the "general public," which is usually law-abiding, aware of the more stringent and Draconian conduct rules, but
unaware of the lenient decision rules; (2) the professional criminal
81 The author seems to totally ignore this point. He says that the "acoustic separation ensures that conduct rules cannot, as such, affect decisions; similarly, decision rules
cannot, as such influence conduct. The two sets of rules are independent." Dan-Cohen,
supra note 1, at 631-32 (emphasis added). This simply misses two critical facts: (1) officials are also members of the general public; (2) a "decision rule" which instructs the
official to punish a person who steals implicitly suggests that there is a conduct rule which
prohibits stealing. Thus, Kelsen is really correct as quoted by Dan-Cohen. See DanCohen, supra note 1, at 627 n.3. See also, H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
61 (1945).
Dan-Cohen's attempt to refute this is unsucessful, since Kelsen is wrong only in a
world of stict liability-where the defendant is not even aware of the reason for his punishment. It is possible, however, that the phrase "as such" in the quote above from DanCohen is intended to mean far less than it suggests, i.e., that although an official faced
with a decision rule which says "Punish all who steal" does not know that there is "as
such" a conduct rule prohibiting stealing, he merely infers that to be the case. Since the
inference would (in a non-strict liability world) always be accurate, the "as such" limitation seems to dissipate rather rapidly.
82 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at passim.
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who, because of his awareness of the leniency of the decision rules,
is able to manipulate the system to his own advantage, both by his
actual awareness of the dissonance, and by a threat to inform the
general public of the dissonance; and (3) officials and others who,
while similarly aware of the decision rules, are less likely to use this
knowledge to their own personal advantage. To the extent that the
criminal and the official act in collusion, each for his own reason, to
keep the general public in the dark about the true rules of law, it will
appear to the general public that these two groups are, to some degree, in a conspiracy against the general good. The disutility of this
perception is apparent.
2.

Dan-Cohen'sApparent Proposal to Stop Leakage-Burning Down the
House to Roast the Lamb

To this critique, Dan-Cohen's response, oblique as it is, is that
the way to prevent leakage, or unfair advantage by those aware of
the decision rules, is to deny the mitigating decision rule in all cases
in which any person is aware of the rule. Thus, he suggests that
defenses like duress "melt away as soon as one relies upon them.
An individual who would not have committed an offense but for his
knowledge of the existence of such a defense cannot, in most cases,
avail himself of the defense .... It is doubtful that expectations [of
83
exculpation] are worthy of protection."
As already argued, his citation to the prisoner escape cases as
support for the proposition that this is how the substantive criminal
law now operates is simply wrong. But even more troublesome are
broader weaknesses in the notion that those who are aware of the
more lenient decision rules should forfeit their right to have them
applied. Since it would be almost impossible to prove that the
"knowledgeable" defendant did in fact rely on the supposed mitigation or exoneration, Professor Dan-Cohen appears to endorse automatic preclusion of the defense whenever there is a "hint" of
relevant knowledge on the part of the defendant.8 4 Thus, apparently, if a criminal law professor faced a threat of death unless she
raised a grade, the professor, when proscuted for this offense,
would be deprived of the defense of duress because she knew of its
availability. This is patently unfair. Even if a defendant injured an
innocent individual, not because the defendant knew that the law
would exculpate him but due to the exigency of the moment, he
83 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 671. See Fletcher, Rights and Excuses, 3 CRIM.J. ETHICS
17 (1984).
84 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 671.
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surely should not be precluded from so acting, or from benefiting
from the defense. Perhaps it is possible to conceive of a demanded
criminal act and a threatened harm so evenly balanced that the reasonable person might find herself in equipoise and where the knowledge that the law would protect her if she committed the criminal
act might tip the scales. Further, it is possible in such a case, that
the reliance upon the duress defense should, as a matter of policy,
be denied. But even if that were a possible case, it is so extraordinary as to avoid the main purpose of the inquiry, which is to guide
everyday behavior. Moreover, significant disutility could arise if people could themselves impose effective strict liabilty upon any official
by simply making threats against the official.
Further, Dan-Cohen's analysis is premised on the assumption
that legally sophisticated actors will, because of their knowledge of
the decision rules, act differently under pressure than the general
public. This assumption may have some validity in non-emergency
situations like mistake of law cases. Intuitively, however, it is unlikely that it is a fair description of the situations on which the author focuses, where the actor, in the author's own words, is "caught
85
in circumstances of emergency, high pressure, and emotion.
This assumption is so counter-intuitive that the burden should be
on Professor Dan-Cohen, rather than upon his critics, to demonstrate its validity.
Additionally, Dan-Cohen's proposed solution of denying defenses to those with knowlege of the decision rule carries the seeds
of its own destruction. If the official, prisoner, or criminal knows of
the decision rule's existence, he also knows (by that very rule) that
he cannot avail himself of it. The "melting away" forecast by DanCohen therefore itself melts away. The defense may be asserted,
since a person who knows that he may not use a defense could not
have knowingly relied on that defense when acting in a situation
under duress or necessity. Therefore, it could be said that the offi86
cial, prisoner, or criminal had no knowledge of the decision rule.
This conundrum seems solveable only by a Gordian knot solution,
which can just as rationally allow the defense as deny it.
Finally, Professor Dan-Cohen's unwillingness to grant
threatened officials the benefit of a more lenient decision rule fails
to recognize, as even Justice Holmes recognized, that "[d]etached
reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted
85 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 641.
86 1 am indebted to my colleague David Bliech for this observation.
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knife." 8 7 That is, the very predicate of deterrence-a fairly reasonable, rational human being-is simply not present when a person is
under duress, or felonious assault. The moral response (assuming
that we can ourselves decide what it is) can only be taught from
88
outside the criminal law entirely.
These critiqes may be wrong, but Professor Dan-Cohen's article
never fully addresses the specter that his position raises: that there
will be two (or three) classes of actors, with varying abilities to obtain the benefits of the morally-based decision rules. Either officials
and others will be able to take advantage of the decision rules and
act "above" the law as articulated in the conduct rules, or (as DanCohen appears to suggest) they will be deprived entirely of the mitigation of the decision rules. In that event, the behavior of officials
will be assessed by the conduct rules, while the behavior of the general public will be measured by the less harsh decision rules. Officials (and other knowledgeables) will thus be punished for what we
acknowledge as morally excusable behavior.
B.

OF DISSONANCE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW

1.

UtilitarianLosses and Critiques

Although he is clear that there are two sets of "rules," Professor
Dan-Cohen is far less clear about the sources of these two sets of
rules, and the relationship between the sources themselves. There
are, it seems to me, two possible models: (1) the conduct rules reflect a need for deterrence and other utilitarian goals while decisional rules are based primarily upon retributivist principles,
reflecting true morality, or (2) the conduct rules reflect moral consensus, while decisional rules are based upon extra-legal considerations (such as mercy) and concerns of a "higher morality."
Although Professor Dan-Cohen does not make clear what he
believes to be the sources of these rules, it appears, on balance, that
he ultimately embraces the first alternative. I will first explain the
difficulty I have being sure of his view, and then address the
problems which either of these two possibilities raise.
Professor Dan-Cohen urges that any policies which the legislature wishes to adopt in its enunciation of the conduct rules are perfectly acceptable. 89 This positivist view is totally incompatible with
87 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
88 Of course, a person who kills in actual, or perceived, self-defense or under duress,
is not morally blameworthy (unless one views negligence as morally blameworthy).

Hence punishment could never be explained on a retributivist basis.
89 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 630-3 1.
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the notion that the source of conduct rules is a shared moral perception. His interpretation that, in reality, conduct rules are based on
utility and not on morality is strengthened by his willingness to deny
some justifications as "defenses" incorporated into the conduct
rules. 90 Thus, he says that:
At least in some cases, the test of necessity should be the actor's
willingness to face.., the threat of criminal punishment unmitigated
by the prospect of legal reprieve... [n]ecessity defenses arising out of
situations of self interest .

.

. should be governed by rules that in a

world of acoustic separation would be conveyed solely to officials. 9 1
The conduct rules would speak in harsh terms, not even acknowledging a defense of self-defense, and certainly not of the defense-ofothers. Indeed, in a discussion of the defense-of-others rules, DanCohen argues that "lawmakers may conclude that the danger to innocent people of this unprofessional use of force outweighs its possible law enforcement benefits." 9 2 In short, the conduct rules
appear to be based purely on deterrence, a reading which seems to
be confirmed by his position that if acoustic separation were abandoned as a strategy, and conduct and decision rules made coterminous, "revelation of the decision rule would diminish the deterrent
effect of the criminal law . . .93
If that is the view Dan-Cohen holds of the respective sources of
the two sets of rules, there are several problems. Many of these are
normative, and will be discussed later.9 4 Here, the utilitarian objections can be raised: Dan-Cohen ignores the "Bumble effect" of such
a system. If conduct rules are stated harshly, in the hope they will
be utilitarian, then decision rules are, or probably will be, more lenient, 95 because they reflect the actual moral consensus of the community about excusing and justifying conditions. To the extent that
officials are not allowed to inform the general public that the wide
disparity between these sets of rules is fictitious, the general public
will conclude, as did Mr. Bumble, that the law is hopelessly out of
touch with the general community. This will engender disrespect
for both the law and the legal system. The disutility should be sufficient to urge caution in endorsing acoustic separation, if this is what
Dan-Cohen perceives that separation to require.
There is another reason why acoustic separation will not be util90 Dan-Cohen, supra note I, at 638 & n.29.
91 Dan-Cohen, supra note I, at 638.
92 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 643.
93 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 672.
94 See infra subsection 2. This obviously suggests that the conduct rule itself is drawn
with regard to the deterrent effect.
95 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 671.
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itarian, if the decision rules are informed by a shared morality. If, in
order to prevent leakage through the jury, officials make increasing
numbers of decisions, these officials may, either for their professional gain or for self-esteem, announce to the public the dissonance between the conduct and decision rules. Regina v. Dudley and
Stephens, 96 exemplifies this position. The facts of the case are so wellknown that they need little repeating here: cast adrift in a lifeboat
on the Atlantic Ocean, and in desperate need of food, Dudley, "with
the assent of Stephens," killed one of the two others in the life
boat.9 7 When they returned to England, Dudley and Stephens were
both indicted for murder.9 8 The Home Department insisted on indictment, apparently because there had been a number of similar
incidents in the previous years. 9 9 The newspapers severely criticized the government for bringing any charges against these
men.10 0 As the London Times then put it, "in this instance it would
be impossible ... to allow the Law to take its course."''1 1
The procedural posture of the case reflects this notoriety. Even
if, as one student note would have it, 102 Baron Huddleston used the
case as a method of demonstrating the need for appellate review of
criminal cases, l0 3 it is also true that the government, especially the
judiciary, used the case to announce strict and unyielding rules for
conduct on the high seas. 10 4 The case essentially turned on a pure
96 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
97 Id. at
98 Id. at
99

A

274.
275.

SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAw

195 (1984).

100 A SIMPSON, supra note 99, at 195.

101 Comment, In Warm Blood: Some Historicaland ProceduralAspects of Regina v. Dudley
& Stephens, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 396 (1967)(quoting The Times (London), Nov. 7,
1884, at 10, col. 2).
102 Comment, supra note 101.
103 Dudley and Stephens was the first case in nearly a century to avoid a general jury
verdict, and to require instead a special verdict, by which the jury reached no conclusion
as to the guilt of the defendants, but only "found the facts" (which were, in fact, drafted
by Baron Huddleston and forced upon thejury). 14 Q.B.D. at 279 ("[U]nder the direction of my learned Brother [Huddleston at Exeter], the jury returned a special verdict
104 As Professor Simpson has brilliantly shown, A. SIMPSON, supra note 99, the rule in
Dudley and Stephens was laid down, not really by the courts, but by the Home Office and
major shippers, who wished to send a clear message to sailors that cannibalism was simply not to be condoned under any situation. As Simpson shows, the "law of the sea"
excused cannibalism in life-boat situations ifthe victim had been selected by lot, which
did not occur in Dudley and Stephens, but did occur in other cases. Id. at 95-195. Indeed,
one of "problems" for the Crown was that Dudley and Stephens did not present a "dicethrowing" case, and therefore, in its holding, the decision could not reach such a situation. Nevertheless, Chief Judge Coleridge went out of his way, in dictum, to make it
clear that not even selection by lot would be tolerated. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at
285. Simpson found, however, that the "message" which the Home Office wanted sent,
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queston of law. And of the law there could be no doubt-necessity,
even in extremis, would not be recognized as a defense to the killing
of an innocent person. Lord Coleridge's opinion rings with declarations of the need for the rule of law even in the most trying of circumstances, and concludes with the hollow-sounding apologia
familiar to all who have read the case: "We are often compelled to
set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules
which we could not ourselves satisfy."' 0 5
Of course, immediately after the court rendered its strident
guilty verdict, Dudley and Stephens received the Queen's pardon. 10 6 Every case book notes this, thereby underscoring the illusory nature of the opinion.
Few cases could so nicely illustrate Professor Dan-Cohen's
"bark and bite" system. Lord Coleridge announced, with all the
majesty which the black robes could afford, harsh conduct rules
drafted for deterrence which no person could follow. And the executive branch, unseen by the public eye, surreptitiously exonerated
Dudley and Stephens by applying a decisional rule tinged with
mercy and empathy.
There are, however, two difficulties. First, it was well understood by all, including Dudley and Stephens, that they would receive
a pardon.' 0 7 The newspapers, which had urged the pardon upon
the government, virtually assured their readers-as well as the defendants-that the government would in the end find a way to avoid
the harshness that the court's rhetoric demanded.' 0 8 Any question
as to whether the hangman awaited these two unfortunate defendants was dispelled by a second fact, which is the gist of these immediate comments, that although it was the custom of English judges
to wear black hats whenever they announced the death sentence, the
judges who marched to the bench on the day of the Dudley and Stephens case wore no such hats.' 0 9 Thus did they inform the defendand which it believed was sent by the opinion in Dudley and Stephens, was never received;
so far as Simpson could discover, later wrecks which resulted in cannibalism continued
without apparent concern as to what would happen if the lifeboat ever reached shore. A.
SIMPSON at 258-61. Indeed, to the extent that his research developed any data (even
soft) on this question at all, Simpson finds that most people after Dudley and Stephens
believed the crime of the defendants not to be cannibalism, but failing to throw lots. A.
SIMPSON, at 253. Thus, the effort of the Home Office, and Judge Coleridge, was apparently unavailing.
105 Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 288.
106 Id. at 288 n.2.
107 See Comment, supra note 101, at 404.
108 Comment, supra note 101, at 404.
109 See Comment, supra note 101, at 404. Yet another example ofjudges insisting on
the "letter of the law" while hoping, indeed expecting, that the defendant would receive
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ants that the words that they uttered (the "conduct" rule) were
meaningless?
The failure of the judges to wear the traditonal hats has substantial significance for Dan-Cohen's theory. It shows that there was
tremendous leakage-from every possible source-between the two
"classes." Even the officials who pronounced the harsh conduct
rules, the judges of the higher court, wished to inform the public
that, however rigorous their language, they were humane persons
whose moral judgments coincided with the decision rule they expected would be applied, and not the conduct rule they announced."10 At the very point that the reason for acoustic
separation becomes most compelling in Dan-Cohen's view, the dissonance between the announced rule and the actual rule impels
those who are aware of the dissonance to inform the general public
that the conduct rule will not be enforced. No official is pleased
when he must announce a rule with which he disagrees and which he
knows will not be enforced. When that rule, moreover, is in discord
with the underlying moral consensus (which, after all, is arguendo
the basis of the decision rule) the need to divulge the attempted
subterfuge will be greatest. The process of acoustic separation simply will not work.
A similar result occurs in the case of euthanasia, which DanCohen surprisingly does not discuss. Virtually every study of euthaexecutive clemency, is given by Seidman, Mens Rea and the Reasonable African: The Presdentific World-View a Mistake of Fact, 15 INT'L. COMP. L.Q. 1135 (1966), where British
judges in African colonies would insist on the need for "deterrence" even where the
defendant had done something perfectly acceptable by native standards, and then would
urge clemency. This is institutionalized in Northern Nigeria, where the Minister for Internal Affairs requires the native court to furnish information in every capital case, including: (a) the state of culture of the deceased (b) an assessment of the influence of the
accused's environment on misbehavior (c) whether the murder is in any way connected
with witchcraft (d) the connection, if any, with local custom, belief, or superstition. Id. at
1161-62.
Dan-Cohen does cite Dudley and Stephens in a footnote, but only to note that the
court there "relegated the matter to the clemency of the Queen." Dan-Cohen, supra
note 1, at 640 n.35. This hardly captures the factual setting of Dudley and Stephens, and
omits entirely the felt need of the court to make clear that the rule of law which it established in that opinion would not carry the usual punishment.
110 This too gets lost in the article. Thus, Professor Dan-Cohen says that
"[e]liminating the defense [of duress] from the conduct rules addressed to the public
allows the system to reap the benefits of maximum obedience to the law." Dan-Cohen,
supra note 1, at 633. There are ambiguities in this statement which need clarification. If
"the law" (as defined by the decision rules) is that duress is a defense, then there is not
"maximum" but "excessive" obedience to the law, and excessiveness which in some
instances may turn out to be counterutilitarian. If, on the other hand, the point is that
by threatening even those who would benefit by a duress defense, we eliminate
fabricators of the defense, then "the law" means "the law as defined by the conduct
rule." Then, it would seem, the decision rule is really "extra legal," if not illegal.
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nasia has found that instances of euthanasia are either not prosecuted at all or, if prosecuted, result in acquittals.1 1 1 Again, though
harsh conduct rules are announced, the principal decision makers
are anxious to inform the public that the conduct rules are dissonant
with true moral precepts (decision rules). Thus, if Dan-Cohen sees
the source of conduct rules as non-shared deterrence goals, the system will collapse.
On the other hand, there are passages and hints in DanCohen's
article that the conduct rules should reflect the general moral con1 12
sensus, and that decision rules are to be even more lenient.
While this is difficult to square with Dan-Cohen's refusal to allow
even justifications to be part of the conduct rules," 1 3 it is a useful
avenue to explore. The author's strongest statement of the position
that it is the conduct rules which should reflect a moral consensus
comes in the analysis of Regina v. Prince,"1 4 where the defendant was
guilty of taking a girl under sixteen from her parents, even though
the jury found that his mistaken belief that she was over the age of
sixteen was reasonable. Critics of that decision have concluded that
either Lord Bramwell did not mean what he said when he declared
that Prince had mens rea, or did not understand the meaning of the
term. Dan-Cohen argues that these critics do not themselves understand Bramwell's point.' 15- Quoting at length from the opinion in
Prince, Dan-Cohen argues that Bramwell saw the taking away of a girl
as the key immoral conduct." 1 6 Thus, since Prince knew that he was
taking away a girl (of whatever age), he had the "general mens rea"
of moral blameworthiness-i.e., he knowingly violated the community norms reflected in the statute. Thus, the statute declared the
morally-based conduct rule ("Do not remove a girl"); her age was,
in fact and in moral consensus, peripheral at best.
This interpretation of Dan-Cohen's piece can be strengthened
from other segments of his article. For example, he declares that
"whereas a conduct rule may be fully coextensive with the relevant
111 See Sanders, Euthanasia: None Dare Call It Murder, 60 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SI. 351 (1969); Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative CriminalLaw, 103 U.
PA. L. REv. 350 (1954); Note, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 46 (1959). There is one exception:
People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920), where the defendant was found
guilty of first degree murder when he provided his wife with poison so that she could
commit suicide. However, the defendant in Roberts pleaded guilty to a murder indictment and the only issue in the case was the degree of murder of which he was guilty.

Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 673-77.
Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 639 n.33.
11"3
114 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875)
115 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 655.
116 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 662. Dan-Cohen rightly notes that Bramwell italicizes
the word several times.
1 12
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moral precept, the corresponding decision rule need not be."" 17 At
another point, he argues that some parts of the criminal law which
address the general public "codifly] aspects of conventional morality."118 The inference that Dan-Cohen believes that most conduct
rules reflect the moral consensus of the community, which can be
drawn from the Prince discussion, is undercut by two observations.
First, in a recap of the analysis of Prince, the keypin assumptionthat conduct rules are coterminuous with moral norms-seems to be
missing, for Dan-Cohen argues that, in light of Prince, "[w]e may
now generalize this illustration and say that the defendant's state of
mind satisfies the mens rea requirement in a criminal statute if the
defendant perceives the facts and that nature of his conduct in terms
of the statute's ordinary-language description of them." 1 19
In other words, since Prince knew that he was taking a "girl"
out of her father's custody, and understood the statute as prescribing that action, he had a "sufficient" mens rea. But the analysis has
problems: (1) if Prince "knew" that the conduct rule (statute) prohibited taking the girl out of custody, he also "knew" that it only
prohibited taking girls less than sixteen out of custody; therefore,
Prince had no mens rea as to girls over sixteen; (2) more importantly, Dan-Cohen seems to have totally ignored the requirement
(contained in his initial discussion) that the conduct be, on some
level, immoral. If the defendant had no doubt as to the meaning of
the statute, there is no vagueness or other objection even if his exact
conduct was not precisely proscribed. Immorality as a basis for conduct rules appears to have disappeared.
If the source of the conduct rules is the general community
moral consensus, and if decisional rules reflect a different consensus, what is the source of these rules of leniency by which the stringency of the conduct rules is relaxed? Dan-Cohen never answers
this question. Yet the question must be asked, and at least tentatively answered. There is only one possible answer-the decision
rules reflect the "higher morality" of the decision makers.
These (higher) decision rules can take the form of either discretionary acts of mercy or the structured application of a consensus
among law-makers. If the essence of the decisional rules is that they
117 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 650 (emphasis added). It is difficult to know whether
the "may" in this sentence is proscriptive or descriptive; i.e., whether a conduct rule
MUST be fully coextensive (in which case, one would assume, it is the same as a decision
rule) or simply could be in some cases, but need not be in all. It would appear, as
suggested in the text, that the latter is the proper interpretation, but there is certainly
some ambiguity in this sentence.
118 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 662 n.103.
119 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 662.
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reflect a felt need for mercy, then it is awkward to call them "rules,"
for it is the very nature of mercy that it is not rule-bound. Mercy is
handed out unequally, since by definition it is not required as a part
of ajust system (although it may well be a desirable and even critical
ingredient of a humane system). 20 But Dan-Cohen does not seem
to contemplate the fact that decisional rules can be arbitrary, because he thinks that the very essence of decisional rules is to limit
official caprice. 12 1 Such a position brings us again to the issue with
which this section began-the establishment of a classist society in
which the moral values of some persons are seen as "higher" than
those of the rest of society. The argument is not merely that one
group cognitively knows the "better" (moral) rules, while the other
group (the general public) is deceived, but rather that the first
group-comprised of state officials-is the only group that knows
the substantively "good" and "moral" rules. If the jury refuses to
exculpate the defendant by applying a valid decision rule, the decision/rule-maker should override the jury's refusal to nullify. This
would be acceptable only if the moral sense of the decision-makers
is better than that of the jury. It is difficult to gauge the moral sense
of the jury if it is either not informed of its nullification power or is
strongly admonished to follow the "law" (conduct rules) even if that
law is adverse to community mores. 12 2 To posit a system of governance on the premise that juries will overcome their own sense of
fairness and follow an unfair law, particularly in criminal cases, is
unfounded in the absence of empirical evidence that juries ignore
their own moral values. This view is so inherently anti-democratic
that even Dan-Cohen refuses to embrace it.
120 This is Dean Morris' explanation for the insanity defense. See N. MORRIS, MADNESS
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1983).

121 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 668.
122 The process of jury nullification supports the view that conduct rules do not always reflect community moral judgments. Dan-Cohen uses the argument over whether
the jury should be informed of its power to nullify as an instance of acoustic separation;
but this, again, suggests that it is the conduct rules which the jury is supposed to apply,
whereas the decision rules are to be applied by another authority at a late, postverdict,
stage. Professor Dan-Cohen's article is, again, ambiguous on the role which jury nullification should play in an acoustically separated society, but it seems to suggest that he
does not see the jury as applying ultimate normative rules. See Dan-Cohen supra note 1,
at 635 n.21. Even when the jury has felt compelled to follow "the law," rather than
enforce its own moral judgments, there have been indications of its unhappiness with
the rigors of the "conduct rules" which Dan-Cohen so strongly supports. Thus, for
example, Friedland records the case ofJohn Albert, in which the jury returned a verdict
of murder. M. FRIELAND, A CENTURY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1984). However, "petitions
to commute the sentence were sent to the Minister ofJustice by all twelve jurymen, by
the major [sic] and aldermen of Toronto, by the three Toronto M.P.'s, by many of the
police officers in Toronto, and by a large number of influential citizens." Id. at 237-38.
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A final utilitarian concern about the efficacy of acoustic separation is the possibilty that not all decision-makers will hear the
proper rule. If the law giver articulates a harsh conduct rule expecting all judges or juries to excuse offenders under a more lenient
decision rule when there is evidence of, for example necessity, it is
still possible that the judge or jury will only hear or follow the conduct rule. If, whether due to selective deafness or ignorance, the
decision-maker applies only the conduct rather than the decision
rule, clearly unequal punishments will result. It is not at all uncommon for defendants to receive sentences, particularly from new
judges or in distant parts of the jurisdiction, which are fully supported by the conduct rule, but which are not intended to be applied because of an unwritten decision rule which is more lenient.
Similar disparities may also arise from purposeful manipulation. Since, as a matter of "law," the actor is not entitled to the
decision rule (if he is so entitled, then acoustic separation is illegal),
he may be deprived of the mitigation unless he succumbs to pressures from a person in the official decision-making chain. Thus, legislatures may enact "habitual offender" statutes that establish an
"extra penalty" for the persistent recidivist. But these statutes are
often applied only to those who refuse to comply with other "conduct" rules, such as the procedural rule that "thou shalt plea bargain." 123 If the habitual offender fails to plea bargain, then the
prosecutor may actually employ the recidivist sanction, in a way
clearly contrary to the intent of the legislature.
In conclusion, let me reiterate my understanding that Professor
Dan-Cohen's view is that the conduct rules are informed by and reflect considerations of utility, while the decision rules reflect a moral
consensus, probably among officials and, to the extent that it can be
ascertained, the consensus among the non-official general public.
Even if he takes the other view that conduct rules are based on
''common morality," while decision rules reflect a "higher" view,
the result is unacceptable. I have already suggested some utilitarian
problems with this proposal. I turn now to normative concerns
raised by the suggestion.
123 It seems clear that these statutes are used almost exclusively in cases where, as
threatened by the prosecutor, as in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), the
defendant refused to bargain. See Note, A Closer Look at Habitual CriminalStatutes: Brown
v. Parrat and Martin v. Parrat, A Case Study of the Nebraska Law, 16 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 275
(1979).
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The Denial of the Rule of Law: The Final and Conclusive Argument
Against Acoustic Separation

The core of the problem with Dan-Cohen's position is that it
advocates falsehood precisely where truth is not only desirable from
a utilitarian standpoint, but demanded from a moral standpoint. As
a general matter, rules of law should reflect the community sense of
acceptable conduct. The rules should, however, not overstate the
restrictions upon conduct, lest the rules chill what is acceptable conduct. Clearly this is true in those areas of autonomy, such as contractual relationships, where even Dan-Cohen would agree activity is
desirable. While no one endorses coercive bargaining behavior,
there is relative agreement that hard bargains, fairly reached, are the
most economic. Rules of conduct which chill such hard bargaining
would be uneconomic.
The same cannot be said of criminal activity, at least criminal
activity which threatens physical well-being. Even if, for example,
we will grant some concessions to a polluter who has been unable to
obtain emission controls, we may not from a utilitarian viewpoint
wish to inform him of possible excuses. But there are countervailling moral concerns that outweigh whatever utilitarian benefits are
achieved by this disingenuousness.
First, many modern criminal scholars, particularly H.L.A. Hart,
view the criminal law-and the restrictions on its reach-as a protector of the individual's freedom of action 124 rather than as the protector of victims, as does Dan-Cohen. The rules of notice and
t 25
vagueness, for example, which Professor Dan-Cohen discusses,
assure an individual in planning his conduct that certain acts fall
outside the reach of the criminal law. For those for whom autonomy
is a precious right, even when that autonomy comes close to criminality, the bark-bite philosophy espoused by Professor Dan-Cohen
1 26
is on shaky ground.
Dan-Cohen's response to this critique is totaly off-point. He
says: "When decision rules are more lenient than the relevant conduct rules, as in our duress example, [n]o one is likely to complain
124 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
125 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 658-64. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.

126 Compare Silberg's explanation of the "rigidity" of Talmudic law, which often eschews vague "standards" by adopting apparently arbitrary "rules." Silberg, supra note
4, at 325
If the goal envisioned by the legislator, the ideal toward which he aspires, is not the
post factum solution of conflict between man and man but the prospective ruling
for moral behavior by each individual, then the consideration of precision and clarity prevails, and the inevitable result is legal formalism.
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about the frustration of an expectation of punishment." 127 This,
however, is surely wrong. The most obvious complainant will be the
victim. While the victim cannot be said to have "relied" upon the
conduct rule, he surely will be annoyed, or worse, when he learns
that there is no penalty, or a lesser penalty, attached to the violation
of the conduct rule than he was led to believe. 128 Moreover, those
who abstained from those acts which the decision rules make legal
may also complain that they would have engaged in equally legal
behavior (which by hypothesis is both blameless and utilitarian) had
they known. Finally, as indicated, the offender who is not afforded
the leniency will also complain.
Dan-Cohen responds that the person who did not act because
of the criminal law's apparent rigidity cannot complain (anymore
than could the brother of the rebellious son) of the mercy bestowed
by the decision rules upon one who did not follow the law's constraints by the decision rules. After all, says the author, one to
whom the law was fairly applied cannot legitimately be embittered
because a higher, better, more lenient non-law was applied to some1 29
one else.
This position has many difficulties. First, it is a sterile positivist
position as to what "law" means in the term "rule of law." DanCohen holds that decision rules are rules that bind their audience,
as opposed to simply unleashed discretion.1 3 0 In light of this assumption, it is unpersuasive to say that only conduct rules count as
"law" because only conduct rules are promulgated by legislation. If
the criteria by which conduct is judged and sanctioned consists of
both conduct and decision rules, both must constitute the "law" in
the term "rule of law." Any position short of this makes a mockery
of the notion of law. This is not merely, as Dan-Cohen seems to
believe, a question of fairness. Rather,it is a core question of
whether the term "rule of law" means anything more than what the
king (or some other decision maker) says it means.
Dan-Cohen clearly disagress with this view. He says, for example, that "by definition conduct rules are all one needs to know in
order to obey the law." 13
' Yet taken to its limit, this would suggest
Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 671.
To the extent, of course, that the victim does not feel victimized, this will not be
true, i.e., if the decision rule reflects a common morality, the victim will not be upset.
For example, if the defendant robbed under duress, and the decision rule accords with
common morality, the victim will agree with the decision rule, even if he is somewhat
perplexed as to why the "rule of law" has not been followed.
129 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 671.
130 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 650.
131 Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 673.
127
128
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the acceptability (if not desirability) of a conduct rule which simply
said "Do nothing which judges (or the king) will dislike." Then if
decisional rules later allowed defenses or mitigation, the actor-citizen could not complain because, after all, he had obeyed the law.
There were, however, some things which he could have done because judges would in fact not have disliked them. This is surely a
skewed notion of what a "rule of law" means.
Informing a person of the rules governing her conduct is not a
purely utilitarian activity; it has normative ramifications as well. The
concepts of a right to be punished, a right to be informed, of rules
which affect one's conduct, are a part of one's personhood; a willingness to ignore those rights, and treat the actor as a pawn bespeaks a lack of a normative appreciation of her humanity.
A second difficulty is whether the decision rules are to be applied before or after guilt determination. This may stem more from
ambiquity than from Dan-Cohen's actual postion on the issue. DanCohen hints, on a number of occasions, that the application of decision rules can occur after the determination of guilt, during the punishment-determination processes. This would surely be a more
effective method of retaining acoustic separation than announcing
the decision rule publicly. But if that is the case-and again I stress
that I believe he is ambiguous on this-then the defendant who is
about to receive the benefit of the lenient decision rule has been
unjustly convicted and stigmatized as a criminal. This improper
stigmatization is a normative wrong which no amount of utilitarianism can assuage. Yet Dan-Cohen does not address this concern at
all.
In summary, the argument for accoustical separation-for a
"bark and bite" system of criminal justice-fails on both utilitarian
grounds and normative grounds. It is important that clear rules of
permissible behavior are announced to us and to all other people
who are interested, for they tell us and the others who we are, and
what we stand for. Perhaps we will not like what we see, viewing it
as either too harsh or too lenient.

